Technologies as agents of change: A simulation model of the evolving complexity of the global energy system by Ma, T. et al.
Technologies as agents of change: 
A simulation model of the evolving 
complexity of the global energy 
system
Ma, T., Grubler, A., Nakicenovic, N. and Arthur, W.B.
IIASA Interim Report
September 2008
 
Ma, T., Grubler, A., Nakicenovic, N. and Arthur, W.B. (2008) Technologies as agents of change: A simulation model of the 
evolving complexity of the global energy system. IIASA Interim Report. IR-08-021 Copyright © 2008 by the author(s). 
http://pure.iiasa.ac.at/8762/ 
Interim Report on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only limited review. Views or 
opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other 
organizations supporting the work. All rights reserved. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work 
for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial 
advantage. All copies must bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. For other purposes, to republish, to post on 
servers or to redistribute to lists, permission must be sought by contacting repository@iiasa.ac.at 
 te for 
ystems Analysis 
A-2361 Laxenburg, Austria 
+43 2236 807 342
x: +43 2236 71313
ations@iiasa.ac.at
Web: www.iiasa.ac.at
International Institu
Applied S
Schlossplatz 1 
Tel: 
Fa
E-mail: public
 
Interim Reports on work of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis receive only
limited review. Views or opinions expressed herein do not necessarily represent those of the
Institute, its National Member Organizations, or other organizations supporting the work. 
Interim Report IR-08-021 
 
 
Technologies as Agents of Change: A Simulation Model of the 
ystem 
 
 
 
Evolving Complexity of the Global Energy S
Tieju Ma, Arnulf Grubler, Nebojsa Nakicenovic, and W. Brian Arthur 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Approved by 
Professor Sten Nilsson 
Acting Director, IIASA 
Revised August 20, 2009 
 
September 9, 2008 
 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis  
Registration number: ZVR 524808900 
  
Note: Revised Version of IR-08-021 August 20, 2009. 
e in the 
n and have 
d of the original 
ersion includes revised graphics reporting on the 
ns. Changes are mostly minor and do not affect the discussion 
and conclusions of the original paper. 
TM, AG, BA, NN. 
 
 
Continued research on the model revealed a computational mistak
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paper can be 
ed a working 
 understand a 
 that portray a 
endence (functional interconnections, or interactions). 
both system 
 system. This 
s with similar 
 ("machines", ranging 
 can apply to 
 systems. It is 
er concept of technological systems complexity that is at the core of this paper. 
We present an agent-based simulation model that emulates the evolution of 
stem. 
 few and can 
 model based 
 
As regards the evolution of complexity of individual artifacts important insights have 
been provided by both research streams: descriptive, e.g. the work of Saviotti, 1996, or 
 of technological variety and 
 based analyses, e.g. the 
el.  
 
                                                
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How does technological complexity arise? Before discussing where this 
situated within the literature on technological complexity, we first ne
definition of complexity in this context. By technological complexity we
system that is characterized by a large number of constituent components
high degree of interdep
Complexification by this definition is a simultaneous increase in 
components and their interdependence (interrelationships) within a given
leads to emergent properties that can lead to alternative development path
or even identical initial conditions. 
 
Technological complexity can apply both to individual artifacts
from tools, to automobiles, all the way up to the space shuttle), as it
combinations of technological artifacts that themselves form technology
the latt
technological complexification in a stylized model of the global energy sy
 
Analytical inroads into technological complexification are comparatively
be classified into two broad categories: descriptive, and (simulation)
analyses.  
Frenken et al., 1999, that analyzed the evolution
complexity of aircrafts and helicopters and simulation model
6 and their model of the evolution of logical circuits, work of Arthur and Polak, 200
which provided an important inspiration for our mod
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Concerning the issue of complexification of entire technological systems 
tradition in the historical qualitative description of the evolution of 
systems (e.g. the work of Hughes, 1983 and 1986, on the evolution
networks with the introduction of concepts of "seamless webs" to descri
comprising technological as well as social and institutional dimensions
the (simulation) modeling strategy in the analysis of the complexifica
technological systems has not been taken up in the literature. A possible
pioneering early study by Frankel, 1955, that however was not
there is a rich 
technological 
 of electricity 
be complexity 
). Conversely, 
tion of entire 
 exception is a 
 followed by further 
n model based 
stems.  
based on prior 
l evolution of 
o resulting in 
ns drawing on 
lop long-term 
dy application 
olicy relevance of a more thorough understanding of the 
evolution of energy systems that are a main contributor to greenhouse gas emissions and 
uced climate change (IPCC, 2007) and the interest in understanding 
better the systems aspects of major technological shifts, such as the ones that will be 
d distribution 
 link available 
ds (for energy 
resources and 
ion of (interlinked) technologies that are defined at 
the level of conversion facilities (e.g. power plants or end-use devices such as cars, and 
that are the customary system boundary for the definition of energy technologies in 
"bottom-up" energy system models; cf. Messner and Strubegger, 1994). Conversion 
facilities (or "primary technologies" in our model) form energy chains2 (Figure 1), that 
nterconnected, 
                                                
model-based analytical studies. Hence our interest to explore a simulatio
strategy in the analysis of the evolution of complexity of technological sy
 
The choice of the case study in the area energy systems evolution was 
work of the authors, providing hopefully some insights into the historica
energy systems (e.g. Grubler, 1998 and 2004) and more importantly als
stylized model formulations and numerical data inputs for our simulatio
the rich tradition of "bottom-up" energy systems models used to deve
energy and climate change scenarios (e.g. Riahi et al., 2007). Our case stu
is also justified by the p
hence human-ind
required for climate stabilization. 
 
1.1. Model Context 
 
The context of our simulation model is a "resource transformation an
system" in which technological components ("conversion technologies")
(primary) resources (fossil and renewable energies) to societal deman
services such as mobility, illumination, etc.). The critical link between 
demands is provided by a combinat
either operate in "stand alone" mode or (over time) are increasingly i
resulting in technological complexification.  
 
 
2
 As will be discussed later, this choice of the level of aggregation for the definition of 
technologies has not only advantages (like structural similarity and hence comparability and 
analogues to conventional energy system models) but also drawbacks. The choice of a 
resource processing system linking primary resources to final demands through technological 
combinations forming energy chains in our model and study implies also a dominance of linear 
structures and combinations in our technological system that are a far cry away from the 
complexity of real-world or simulated systems (e.g. the ones modeled by Arthur and Polak, 
2006). 
 2
An energy system consisting of various energy chains forms a network w
resources at the input side and energy services at the output sid
technological combinations or chains can provide the same energy servi
they compete, i.e. are subject to an (econom
ith available 
e. Alternative 
ces, and hence 
ic) selection environment in our model, as 
in the real world. 
 
n. 
mbination e.g. 
 walk model 
ation) subject 
e assume that 
binations is a 
rces that can "generate" 
omy and the 
incentives can 
propensity for 
logies. 
ergy services 
 emergence of 
ld be. Higher 
process. 
indefinitively. 
or emerging 
nd cannot be 
er case, the 
tion environment" (inspired by the work of evolutionary economists, 
e.g. Dosi, 1982) is key. We adopt in our model an essentially economic interpretation of 
 combinations 
cess efficiencies 
and costs) as well as external factors (e.g. a change in relative prices through taxes that 
etitiveness of 
olution of our 
 
The selection environment for technologies is characterized by several features, 
reflecting a number of "stylized facts" emerging from the literature (e.g. Dosi, 2000).  
                                                
 
Figure 1. An energy chain for satisfying the demand for illuminatio
The emergence of new component technologies as well as their (re-)co
into new energy chains is essentially conceptualized via a random
(reflecting the unpredictability, often serendipity, of technological innov
however to resource constraints and economic incentives. In our model, w
the rate of emergence of new technologies and new technological com
function of available (financial and human capital) resou
innovations, modeled simply in proportionality to the size of the econ
resulting demand for energy services. Also, we assume that economic 
trigger innovation, e.g. rising energy prices would result in a higher 
innovation and hence higher probability of emergence of new techno
 
In other words, we assume that the larger a system (in terms of en
demanded), the larger the propensity to innovate and the larger the rate of
new technologies and the possibilities for new (re-)combinations wou
energy prices add an additional incentive to increase the dynamics of this 
 
Once in existence, new technologies or combinations cannot survive 
Either technologies are not retained once integrated into existing 
technological combinations (chains) 3 , or they emerge "prematurely" a
integrated into any available technological combinations. For the form
concept of "selec
the selection environment governing the survival of technologies or their
comprising both endogenous (e.g. the evolution of technological pro
reflect environmental and other externalities) that alter the comp
alternative technological combinations and hence over time change the ev
technological system. 
 
3
 Consider the example of the Stirling engine that despite being known for almost 200 years and 
demonstrated as feasible (functional toy kits are available on the market) has to date not been 
integrated into existing energy systems. 
Light 
Coal 
extraction 
Coal 
trans`portation
Coal power 
plant 
Ele
dist
ctricity 
ribution 
Coal Light 
bulb resources 
 3
 First, not only the technological "landscape" but also the characteristics
technologies are dynamic. Second, the selection environment is cha
persistent uncertainty (in both exogenous and endogenous variable
selection criteria have an important economic dimension, i.e. among altern
the cheaper technological combinations (chains) providing a given service
prevail over time. Decisions operate however under uncertainty and w
knowledge and localized "learning", i.e. a given existence of a
technological combination with certain economic attributes (e.g. co
propensity for adoption that evolves however only gradually as a resu
learning and its ultimate spillover into the entire system. This is in contras
deterministic "bottom up" and "top down" energy (and economy) mode
perfect foresight and thus instantaneous adoption of new technologies and
universally. Finally, supply and demand in our model co-evolve. While on
energy service demands are assumed to be given (represented by an exogenous scenario 
 of individual 
racterized by 
s). Third, the 
ative choices, 
 demand will 
ith imperfect 
 (functional) 
sts) creates a 
lt of localized 
t to traditional 
ls that assume 
 combinations 
 the one hand, 
in our model simulations), new technological combinations can also create new 
or substituting 
ations, e.g. in 
t by a number 
hnologies are 
e. the more a 
deled here via 
 as uncertain. 
entation of the 
tics (e.g. their 
r adoption is 
e assumptions 
 small market 
ke-off pattern 
e also use a variable in the 
e" variable for 
ly into new 
iting potential 
on impatience 
y disappear 
n be integrated into new technology combinations. 
 
The key research question in this paper is to understand how a (stylized and highly 
simplified) energy system bootstraps and evolves. To that purpose we develop a new 
model for simulating technological complexification that is used to generate alternative 
"histories" (and futures) of the evolution of the global energy system. We perform a 
large number of simulations (200) and then analyze the simulation runs for differences, 
coherent patterns and emerging properties, characterizing technological 
complexification. 
 
demands. An example is the emergence of electricity, first introduced f
town gas as source of illumination and subsequently finding new applic
communication (telephone) or mobility (street cars). 
 
We reflect the above "stylized" characteristics of the selection environmen
of (simplified) model assumptions and formulations. The dynamics of tec
assumed to be governed by uncertain increasing returns to adoption, i.
technology is tried, the higher its probability that it actually improves, mo
a learning-by-doing (learning curve) formulation that is however treated
Localized learning is represented by a kind of probabilistic model repres
adoption process in which new information on technology characteris
costs) takes time to percolate within a system and the propensity fo
assumed to inversely proportional to realized deployment levels. Thes
imply that recent technologies with highly uncertain characteristics and
volume will be adopted only very cautiously, yielding the classical slow ta
characteristic of technological diffusion (Grubler, 1991). W
model that represents innovation impatience: modeled via a "retention tim
newly emerging technologies that cannot be integrated immediate
technological combinations but nonetheless "stay around" for a while awa
integration into the technology system. Evidently, with high innovati
(short retention time), many new technologies emerge, but subsequentl
before they ca
 4
A particularly novel feature of our agent based model is that it treats te
their constituent components, as "agents" while preserving innovation
drivers as main components of the evolutionary algorithm underlying a 
)combination of technologies resulting in an emergence and subsequent "o
up of novel systems struc
chnologies, or 
 and economic 
continued (re-
rganic" build-
tures, punctuated by Schumpeterian "gales of creative 
estruction" (Schumpeter, 1942) resulting from the emergence of new technologies and 
r system (our 
rms resources 
sis (Ayres and 
Messner and 
source/energy 
resulting efficiency, and associated emissions, and costs (for sake of 
 and operating 
t govern their 
stem (and not 
rces or energy 
ins are either 
of previously 
cept of energy 
 the necessary 
l technologies 
 Conversely, it 
ear" combinations of energy technologies, 
ay not 
 the electronic 
systems structures emerging from our model simulations are first of all the result of our 
del extensions 
hains that can 
 energy services linking primary energy with combinations 
                                                
d
of new technological combinations.  
      
2. The Model 
2.1. Main Characteristics of the Model 
 
In our model, energy technologies, the technological constituents of ou
"agents"), are defined at the level of a facility/plant or a device that transfo
or energy flows following both the tradition of activity or process analy
Kneese 1969) as well as that of "bottom-up" energy models (e.g. 
Strubegger, 1994). Technologies have characteristics, defined by their re
inputs, outputs, 
simplicity we use levelized costs, i.e. do not differentiate between capital
costs of technologies). It is these characteristics of the technologies tha
long-term survival under the selection environment of our technology sy
their mere existence). 
 
Energy chains are linked energy technologies that connect primary resou
sources/forms to the energy service demands of consumers. Energy cha
new combinations of primary energy technologies or re-combinations 
existing components (groups of technologies or entire chains). The con
chains is central to the technological system modeled here: It reflects both
supporting "front-" (upstream) and "back-end" (downstream) of individua
(e.g. the electricity supply chains necessary to make a light bulb shine).
also implies a certain dominance of "lin
characteristic for systems at our chosen level of aggregation, but that m
necessarily be the case when modeling other technological systems (e.g.
circuits studied by Arthur and Polak, 2006). We contend, that these largely "linear" 
chosen level of aggregation (energy facilities), but further studies and mo
will be needed to corroborate this hypothesis.4 
 
An energy system is a system consisting of an ensemble of energy c
satisfy a specified bundle of
 
4
 We plan to relax the simplifying assumptions underpinning our definition of technologies in 
future modeling studies. E.g. instead of defining a "technology" at the level of a physical 
plant/facility converting resources or energy carriers (e.g. a coal fired power plant generating 
electricity), one could also define the technologies of our system at the level of component 
technologies (e.g. a boiler, steam turbine, and generator, for our coal power plant example), 
yielding more complex system structures. Lack of suitable data underpinning our simulations 
have precluded this extension to date. 
 5
of technologies to satisfy final human service demands. (A description and graphical 
viously exist; 
uilding blocks 
 chains build 
xisting energy 
human service 
 For example, 
, such as cars; 
ill further pull 
tructures, oil 
raction, and so on.  We also consider the fact that some final human 
ple, it is after 
 provided by 
newly formed 
algorithm of 
characteristics of technologies (initial values as well as possible changes over time, i.e. 
 external costs 
imate change 
the following 
d final human 
e. Existing technologies and chains 
tential future 
not available 
come existing 
isting energy 
 reflecting the 
 “draws” and 
ction of new 
y is randomly 
when existing 
technologies or entire chains are melded together to form new chains. For each attempt 
of combination, the model randomly selects any two energy technologies and/or chains 
from the table to see whether they can be linked – by linking the output of one 
technology (chain) to the input of another technology (chain). If they can be linked, the 
model checks whether the technological combination(s) can satisfy at least one kind of 
energy service demand.  If a technology combination can satisfy an energy service 
demand, that combination is added as "existing" to the portfolio of technological 
combinations/chains characterizing the energy system at a particular point in time of our 
overview is given in Section 2.2 below. Numerical details are given in Appendix B.) 
 
In our model, new energy chains are constructed from components that pre
and in turn these new chains offer themselves as possible components – b
– for the construction of further new chains. In this sense, energy
themselves out of themselves changing the morphology of previously e
systems. The evolution of an energy system is ultimately driven by final 
demands and by the demands created by new energy technologies/chains.
demand for mobility pulls the development of transportation technologies
and cars generate a market for gasoline, and the demand for gasoline w
the development of technologies such as transport and retail infras
refineries, oil ext
demands are triggered by the availability of new technologies, for exam
computers became available that demands for some of the services
computers developed.  
 
The emergence of new energy technologies or combinations in the form of new energy 
chains is a stochastic process, whereas the further existence of existing or 
technological combinations (chains) is governed by an evolutionary 
"survival of the fittest" largely based on economic criteria. Costs include both intrinsic 
costs can fall as a function of increasing returns to adoption), as well as
(represented in our simple model through a carbon tax to reflect cl
externalities). The simulation model is described in more detail in 
paragraphs. 
 
Consider a following analogy: Energy technologies are cards on a table an
service demands are cards on a board above the tabl
can be viewed as face-up cards on the table; there are also po
technologies/chains (face-down technology "wildcards") which are 
currently. From time to time, some face-down cards will turn over and be
technologies (at random draw). We start our simulations from a few ex
technologies (not energy chains) and several energy service demands
historical situation before the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
 
In each year (represented by a simulation step), a certain number of
“combinations” will be carried out. Here draws mean the introdu
technologies. At each draw, with a certain probability, a future technolog
selected and becomes an existing one. New combinations emerge 
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simulations (i.e. it is added to the "table" as an existing technology comb
In case a new technological combination/chain creates a new demand (ou
pre-specified pot
ination/chain). 
t of a range of 
ential demand categories), the new demand is retained as well (i.e. 
 the two most 
imated by the 
ly, the search 
Thus, the number of "innovation draws" and of technological combinations is a 
) in Appendix 
ld be satisfied 
ombination of 
 human service demands. 
o matter how 
 technological 
ns, or market 
.   
are treated as 
 consider in a 
e costs of our 
f demand into 
c assumptions 
echnological combinations and the dynamics of 
the technology portfolios of evolving energy systems, reflect our interpretation of the 
systems (see 
nd depletion, 
ns to adoption 
 demands (via 
 simulates the 
ains satisfying 
the long-term 
 the fittest" technologies. At each step, if one viable chain is cheaper 
(considering both internal as well as external [environmental externality] costs) than the 
weighted average cost of all viable chains satisfying the energy service demand [see Eq. 
(5) in Appendix A], its share will increase, where the degree of market share gain is 
assumed to be proportional to the respective cost differences. The bigger the difference 
(i.e. compared to the average costs), the bigger the market share increase will be. The 
share of chains more expensive than the weighted average will decrease as well. The 
mathematical expression of the dynamics of chain market shares is given by Eq. (5 to 7) 
in Appendix A.   
 
added to the "board"). 
 
The number of draws and combinations in each year is responsive to
pertinent variables affecting technological change: available resources (financial and 
human capital) and prices. Thus, as the size of the economy grows (approx
growth of energy service demands in our model) or prices increase rapid
for new technologies will be higher than in small-size economy/low price scenarios. 
combined function of size of the system and energy prices [see Eq. (10
A].  
 
As the simulation progresses, any given final energy service demand cou
by several viable energy chains. A viable chain is defined here as a c
technologies that can link primary energy resources with final
For a newly formed viable chain, we assume a small market share, n
expensive it may be. This reflects our interpretation of the history of
innovation that is governed by expectations (e.g. of future cost reductio
viability under possible external constraints, e.g. carbon taxes in our case)
 
The cost of technologies and their combination into energy chains 
dynamic due to technological learning and resource depletion. We also
stylized fashion that demand quantities interact with prices (reflected in th
technology chains), adopting the concept of income and price elasticity o
our simulation model [see Eq. (4) in Appendix A]. These three basi
governing the relative economics of t
most salient economic drivers in the long-term evolution of energy 
Nakicenovic et al., 2000; Grubler et al., 1999): resource discovery a
dynamic costs of energy technologies due to (uncertain) increasing retur
(uncertain "learning" effects), and in turn their feedback on energy service
price elasticity in addition to income elasticity). 
 
The next issue is to address the nature of the genetic algorithm that
survival and competition among alternative technology combinations/ch
particular service demands. We assume that relative costs govern 
"survival of
 7
For the dynamics of final service demands in our model, we assumed first
rate of increase for the aggregate economy that yields increases in inco
(with an assumed income elasticity) an exogenous increase in service dem
service demands are also influenced by the price for satisfying them, whic
by the weighted average cost of viable chains satisfying a particular 
demand. Changes in prices translate into changes in service dema
elasticities. Each final  energy  service d
 an exogenous 
me and hence 
ands. Energy 
h is calculated 
energy service 
nds via price 
emand is recalculated with the assumed price 
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 demands are 
rimary energy 
ntifications of 
r our model 
s new energy 
action costs are lowered due to technological 
nstant or even 
urce depletion 
re considered 
tion of one of 
stems (Fisher, 
fects for new 
h cumulative 
 is a classical 
technological 
learning is also highly uncertain, evidenced by both empirical (e.g. see IIASA-WEC, 
ritsevskyi and 
e assume that 
e random values around mean 
expected values (with lognormal distributions) following Grubler and Gritsevskyi 
 
alues of above 
nd decline of 
  
ions, we use a hypothetical, simplified, but to a certain degree realistic 
representation of the global energy system as it has evolved since the Industrial 
Revolution. The constituents (technologies) of the energy system are represented by 
customary engineering and economic variables that are treated as dynamic in the 
                                                
elasticities at every simulation step .  Thus final energy service
determined both exogenously and endogenously in our model. 
 
As concerns resource depletion, we simply assume the cost of extracting p
resources increases with cumulative extraction. We draw on the qua
cumulative resource extraction cost curves of Rogner (1997) fo
parameterization. Of course, things could be more complex in reality: A
resources are discovered, or resource extr
change (which is not modeled here), extraction costs could well be co
decrease over time, as opposed to the increasing trends due to reso
suggested by our simple model.    
 
Finally, costs of technologies or of technological combinations/chains a
dynamic in the simulations reported here. Again this reflects our interpreta
the most important "stylized facts" in the historical evolution of energy sy
1974, Grubler et al., 1999). We assume the existence of learning ef
primary energy technologies, which means costs can decrease wit
experience (technology deployment or adoption). Technological learning
example of increasing returns (see Arthur 1983 and 1989). However, 
1995 and Nakicenovic et al., 1998) as well as modeling studies (G
Nakicenovic, 2000; Grubler and Gritsevskyi, 2002). In our model, w
potential future learning rates of new technologies ar
(2002).  
Appendix A summarizes the mathematical expressions and numerical v
genetic algorithm governing competition and ensuing growth, survival, a
technological combinations/chains in our simple simulation model.   
2.2. The Reference Energy System 
 
For our simulat
 
5
 This explains the pattern of drastically reduced service demands in some of the simulations 
reported below as a function of increasing costs (e.g. due to resource depletion and under 
absence of potential learning [i.e. cost lowering effects] of new technological 
combinations/chains). 
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simulations. A schematic overview is given in Figure 2 depicting the reference energy 
system at step 300 of our simulations. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  An overview of the simplified reference energy system 
simulations. Squares denote energy resources, energy carriers, or e
demands (always shown in white color). Ellipses represent pr
technologies, the basic constituents of the model that combine into 
in the model 
nergy service 
imary energy 
alternative energy 
chains. The technology color codes indicate the level of deployment of various 
ng embryonic 
ot used at all 
nkage is given 
ution pictures 
ABES_08/
technologies ranging from large (red), very small (either emergi
technologies or technologies being phased out, yellow) to technologies n
(white). Arrows indicate the direction of linkages, whereas the extent of li
as numerical values of the corresponding energy flows. For high resol
and dynamic simulations see http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/  
ies which are 
stored in a “technology base” at the beginning of the simulations. The 62 primary 
technologies are classified into three groups. The first group consists of 5 very basic 
technologies -- biomass extraction, biomass transport and distribution, biomass burning 
for providing illumination, biomass furnaces for providing heat, and (biomass [feed] 
fuelled) horses that provide mobility. Technologies in this group are all available at the 
beginning of the simulation, as representing the main energy technologies extant before 
the onset of the Industrial Revolution. The second group consists of 49 "traditional" 
technologies related to the application of fossil fuels and also hydropower. They 
 
Our simplified energy system is composed of 62 primary energy technolog
 9
become available randomly after our simulation starts, with 0.01 proba
step) that one of them is drawn out from the “technology (knowledge) b
group of technologies consists of 8 so-called "advanced" technologies, suc
fuel cells. They are assumed to start to become available randomly a
simulation steps, also with 0.01 probability that one of them is drawn
“technology base”. Finally, we also deploy the concept of "backstop" tec
technologies that are assumed to exist and can be taken "off the shelf" in
needed (especially to assure a feasible model solution). The existence of
technologies is an optional feature in our model; simulations can be per
without the availability of "backstops" (see Section 3 below). All the technologies, 
bility (at each 
ase”. The third 
h as hydrogen 
fter some 130 
 out from the 
hnologies, i.e. 
 case they are 
 "backstop" 
formed with or 
 technological 
 effects, i.e. a technology’s cost will decrease with its cumulative output.6 
nergy service 
tricity or hydrogen (in 
addition to other energy services), e.g. telecommunication (E/H2 Ser);  
industry feedstocks, i.e. energy used for non-energy purposes (Non-F). 
ies excluding 
ogies become 
resource side, we consider 9 kinds of natural resources: biomass, coal, oil, gas, 
uranium, hydro, wind, solar, and deuterium. We assume the first 5 resources are 
 (cumulative) 
fects but with 
considered as 
potentials. 
  
Figure 2 shows the energy system at the end of a simulation, with the 9 resources at the 
he 62 primary 
s. Details and 
an be found in 
                                                
except resource extracting technologies, are assumed to exhibit uncertain
learning
 
Our simplified energy system is in addition defined by the following 5 e
:   demands
• illumination (light); 
• specific services provided by devices consuming elec
• heat; 
• mobility and/or mechanical energy (Mech); 
• 
 
Simulations start initially for the four energy service demand categor
E/H2, with the latter only emerging once corresponding supply technol
available. 
  
At the 
depleteable, which means their extraction costs will increase with
extraction; hydro and wind are treated as renewable, without depletion ef
upper limits on their annual supply potential; solar and deuterium are 
backstop resources, without any depletion effects or upper limitations on their annual 
left side and the left-bottom, the 5 energy services at the right side, and t
technologies forming a network to link energy services to resource
numerical parameters of the simplified energy system and of our model c
Appendix B.    
 
6
 As modeling simplification we simply assume that historically new technologies, when they 
emerge are a factor 3 higher compared to the period of their maximum use and exhibit a mean 
learning rate of 10% per doubling of cumulative output. For the 8 current advanced technologies 
we assume a mean learning rate of 30% and initial cost estimates are derived from the scenario 
literature (Nakicenovic et al., 2000). All learning rates are treated as uncertain. Cost of 
extraction technologies are assumed to be determined soley by resource depletion and are 
modeled after the data given in Rogner, 1997. 
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3. Model Simulations 
se simulations 
ach simulation for 
500 (time) steps (akin to years ). We then perform additional sensitivity runs, altering 
y system.  
atures ("stories") that emerge in 
 evolution and 
 system of our model. 
of chance and 
system. With 
an emerge (be 
l technological and economic characteristics of technologies 
ctures emerge 
nt simulations, 
ht experiments 
to alternative 
ns that persist. 
a result of the 
alk model of 
doption is a dynamic behavior that to our knowledge has not been 
described in any energy model to date. The state of art describes such bifurcations 
usually by varying exogenous assumptions across different simulations (scenarios), 
while in our case differences emerge endogenously with identical assumptions and 
initial conditions.  Figure 3 provides an illustration of this bifurcation and path-
dependence showing the results from two simulations (Sim159 and Sim53) at identical 
time steps (1, 20, and 50).8  
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
For exploring the evolution of the energy system, we first run 200 base ca
with base-line parameter values as specified in Appendix B. We run e
7
model assumptions to explore their influence on the evolution of the energ
 
We report below some persistent patterns and robust fe
our model simulations and that characterize the long-term
complexification of the stylized global energy
 
3.1. Bifurcation, Lock-in, and Path Dependence 
 
One of the most intriguing findings from our simulations is the degree 
serendipity characterizing the evolution of our simulated technology 
identical initial conditions, identical suite of potential technologies that c
discovered), and identica
and drivers (e.g. service demands), nonetheless different system's stru
across the simulations. Alternative histories and futures unfold in differe
providing numerical illustrations for both counterfactual historical thoug
and alternative future scenarios. 
 
Given identical initial conditions, the energy system self-organizes in
different structures, evolves ("locks-in") into alternative different directio
This feature of bifurcation, path-dependence and emergent properties is 
randomness of the innovation process combined with a random w
increasing returns to a
 
 
 
7
 Readers wishing to position our simulations in "real", historical time should consider the 
present anyway between simulation time step 100 to 120 in our "simulated, virtual" years of the 
evolution of the global energy system. 
8
 The full results of all 200 simulation runs over 500 time steps can be accessed at 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/ABES_08/ 
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Simulation ID = 24 (Sim24). 
                 
                          Step = 20                              Step=50 
 
Simulation ID = 50 (Sim50). 
Step = 1   
                
 
o illustrative 
e technologies 
uctures of the 
gy system as it 
 emergence of 
inty, localized 
gies as well as 
0 Gas bio (gas 
ile Oil ppl (oil 
 not available 
ons are almost 
cept oil lam [oil lamp]), oil fur [oil furnace for heating] and Oil eng [oil 
 Sim159, the 
 and biomass, 
technologies are applied to generate electricity from coal, gas, biomass, uranium, and 
hydro with electricity beings used to power end-use devices such as Elec HP (Electric 
air-condition).    
 
Figure 4 plots the dynamics of resource extraction from time step 50 to step 160 for our 
two illustrative simulations Sim159 and Sim53. In Sim53, nuclear dominates from 
around time step 70 to around 110; in Sim159, over the same period, coal dominates 
Step = 1                             Step = 20                              Step=50 
Figure 3. Alternative structures of the energy system evolving in tw
simulations: Sim24 versus Sim50 for three time steps. Red ellipses denot
in actual use. 
 
Since the two simulations start with identical initial conditions, the str
energy system at step 1 are identical as well, basically describing an ener
prevailed before the advent of the Industrial Revolution. With the random
new technologies and a selection environment characterized by uncerta
learning and (uncertain) increasing returns to adoption, available technolo
their deployment levels are radically different. For instance at time step 2
from biomass) are available in Sim159 while not available in Sim53, wh
power plant) and Gas ppl (gas power plant) are available in Sim53 while
in Sim159. At step 50, although available technologies in the two simulati
the same (ex
engines for motive power] which are still not available in Sim159, the structures of the 
energy system in the two simulations are nonetheless quite different. In
energy system relies on coal and biomass; while in Sim53, besides coal
(natural) gas and (nuclear) uranium are also used, and various electricity generating 
 12
initially, with the system switching to a diversified resource portfolio relying on 
nuclear, gas and coal.   
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 Figure 4. Dynamics of resource extraction (in KWyr) in two simulations: Sim24 versus 
Sim50 over time steps 50 to 160.   
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 Over the very long-term (300 simulation years) the energy system invar
solar or deuterium (or both) due to depletion effects for fossil resources
the harnessing of the conventional renewable resources wind and hyd
Technologies relying on deuterium or solar (fusion or solar power p
considered as the long-run "backstop" technologies of the energy system
that even when all other resources are depleted, the energy system can 
those technologies. Figure 5 is an example of “path-dependence” of the
the exactly same initialization, Sim159 ends with a solar-dominated, whi
with deuterium-dominated energy system, albeit at different levels of res
energy service demands. This indicates a pattern in which the long-term
energy systems, both in terms of resource use (and the correspond
iably shifts to 
 and limits on 
ro (Figure 5). 
lants) can be 
 in the sense 
always rely on 
 model – with 
le Sim53 ends 
ource use and 
 evolution of 
ing environmental 
 demands are 
olicy leverage 
l change. 
 
Many other simulations end with a combination of both deuterium and solar-dominated 
technologies. As such, the hypothesized (Haefele et al., 1981) emergence of "Solfus" as 
ultimate long-term "winner" in a resource constrained global energy system appears 
corroborated by our simulations. 
 
externalities, such as carbon emissions) as well as energy (service)
technologically constructed, indicating the importance of technology as p
in coming to grips with the negative environmental consequences of globa
 
                      
 
Figure 5.  Long-term bifurcation of the energy system into reliance on alternative 
“backstop” technologies solar or fusion (extraction rates in kWyr): Sim159 (left) versus 
Sim53 (right) over time steps 160 to 300 (top panel) and distribution of long-run 
extraction rates for solar(left)  and fusion (deuterium, right) across all 200 simulations 
(bottom panel).  
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 Readers might object to above conclusions on the importance of histo
alternative 
rical or future 
contingencies, i.e. the powerful effects of small random events
the system into persistent, alternative directions (and thereby permanent
possibility of some futures). However, our results rather suggest the 
human agency (intentionality and choice) in the long-run evolution of 
systems that even if represented as being random in the model, nonetheles
policy intervention in the real world. Imagine Thomas Edison (and
contemporaries like Nikola Tesla) never existed, or alternatively, that h
been instead a contemporary of James Watt. Would we expect the ene
today in its current configuration? Our results indicate not. Perhaps the m
lesson to draw from our simulations is the potential of policy interven
trigger long-run bifurcations in large technological systems such as ene
the emergence of alternatives and influencing th
 that can "tilt" 
ly exclude the 
importance of 
technological 
s lend itself to 
 many of his 
e would have 
rgy system of 
ost important 
tions that can 
rgy: nurturing 
e selection environment through policy 
hen measured 
ns", but could 
rbations over 
ing randomly 
d of time (e.g. 
&D effort of the size of the Apollo Project), is unlikely to trigger long-term 
bifurcations in energy systems.9 Providing incentives for an incremental increase in the 
ical "landscape", coupled with 
consistent
signals (cf. the discussion of the influence of a carbon tax below), that w
at the scale of the system at stake, might appear minor "perturbatio
nonetheless provoke lasting long-term bifurcation effects.  
 
An important conclusion from our model simulations is that random pertu
short periods of time have little long-lasting effects. For instance, increas
enormously the rate of emergence of new technologies for a limited perio
through an R
propensity to innovate across the entire technolog
 signals to change the economic incentives prevailing in the technological 
rastic system 
energy system 
ies appear and 
g technologies 
 However, while complexification is a 
powerful tendency, the simulations reveal as well that complexification cannot unfold 
erges 
ics as well as 
 technology is 
 the global 
energy system without a careful consideration of both the endogenous and exogenous 
environment under which technological complexity evolves. 
                                                
selection environment (e.g. through carbon taxes) might result in d
transformations. 
 
3.2. Complexification versus technological "denudation" 
 
Starting initially with only 5 primary technologies, the structure of the 
becomes invariably more complex in all simulations, as new technolog
become integrated into the system by recursive combinations with existin
and chains as well as competing with each other.
indefinitely, nor that it is preordained. Technological systems complexification em
as a consequence of both the characteristics governing technology dynam
that of the selection environment. More and more complex in terms of
therefore not a safe bet to use in historical as well as prospective studies of
 
9
 In a sensitivity analysis we increased the probability of emergence of a subset of new 
technologies (i.e. of group 2, that represent current technologies [the largest number of 
technologies in our model], i.e. excluding pre-industrial as well as advanced future technologies) 
by a factor of 5. Nonetheless, despite this simulated "innovation frenzy" the impact on 
technological complexity remains very small, cf. Figure 6 below. 
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 As measure of complexity, we simply use the notion of viable 
characterizing an energy system. A viable chain means a full energy chai
from extracting resource and satisfies a final energy service demand. W
chain has a market share above 0.1%, it is considered to be in use. 
measure of complexity, we simply consider the number of viable energy
and that characterize different energy systems over time. Given that we
simulations it is necessary to summarize their diversity i
energy chains 
n which starts 
hen a viable 
As aggregate 
 chains in use 
 have run 200 
nto simpler aggregates. To that 
age over 200 
plexity peak". 
 chains in use 
er. Increasing 
eas decreasing 
erian “creative 
 increasingly 
eir economic 
e system does 
fter some time 
minate over 
 decline in 
 of complexity 
f the Industrial 
 our modeling 
f pre-defined 
eper reason as 
end Figure 6 below summarizes our simulations in terms of the aver
simulations. (For a full display of heterogeneity see Figure 7 below). 
 
An invariable pattern emerging from our simulations is that of a "com
Whereas initially technological complexity in terms of number of energy
increases, it reaches a peak around time step 150, and declines thereaft
complexity is the result of recursive combinations of technologies, wher
complexity is the result of “lock-out” effects of technologies or Schumpet
destruction”: Newly formed viable chains with advanced technologies
squeeze out existing viable chains that are progressively loosing th
competitive edge due to resource depletion. Since in our simulations th
not have an infinite suite of new technologies that can be introduced, a
(i.e. around step 150), technological “lock-out” effects start to do
recombinatory (complexification) effects. The end result is a drastic
technological complexity. After some 400 time steps (or years), the level
of the energy system in our model is back where it started at the onset o
Revolution. Evidently this result could to a certain degree be an artifact of
protocol (innovations can only randomly appear out of a pool o
technologies that ultimately becomes exhausted). But there is also a de
well: resource depletion. With the onset of depletion effects (increasing r
increasingly fossil fuel technologies and energy chains, that have traditio
for much of technological variety and complexity in the energy land
"locked out" and the sys
esource costs), 
nally provided 
scape become 
tems relies increasingly on the two major "backstop" resources: 
ing key conversion technologies for 
n). The significantly higher (in fact the highest
solfus (solar and fusion) and the correspond
electricity and for liquid fuels (hydroge ) 
complexity of the model simulations without available backstop technologies (Figure 6) 
ogies over the 
o referred to it 
 
Another interesting finding from our simulations is that complexity and increasing 
returns to adoption are to a certain degree at odds with each other. In order to analyze 
this effect we have performed a sensitivity analysis of 200 additional simulations with a 
drastically lowered mean learning rate parameter. 10  In the "low learning" case, 
                                                
reconfirms this notion. This increasing dependence of a few key technol
very long-term was hypothesized as early as 1956 by Harrison Brown, wh
as "technological denudation." 
3.3. Increasing returns and crowding out 
 
 
10
 In the baseline simulations we have assumed mean learning rates of 10% for existing, and of 
30% for the 8 advanced technologies. In the "low learning" simulations we assume mean 
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technological complexity of the energy system is both higher in absolute
as exhibiting a substantially later peak (at time step 190, as opposed 
baseline simulation) before eventually also entering the pathway towards
denudation as a result of resource depletion. Figure 7 shows the full res
simulations for both the baseline a
 terms as well 
to 150 in the 
 technological 
ults of all 200 
nd the low learning case. The calculated averages are 
reproduced in Figure 6 to allow easier comparison with other model sensitivity runs on 
mics of large 
ns as well (see 
omplexity and 
enefits of an 
s to adoption 
8 below), and 
ave some risk 
tions between 
less variety in 
 case of a sudden change in external 
tion of how to 
corresponding 
"lock out" of 
bservation that 
ion of energy 
have assumed a mean learning rate of 10% (per 
arance of new 
 emerge, our 
comparatively 
r simulations), 
ent paths and 
nterpretations. 
ial alternative 
small random 
(first in a coal 
dominated steam economy in the 19th century, and then an oil dominated internal 
ly our baseline 
ns is far more 
red than suggested in the smoothly growing trajectory of our 
model simulations, or the mean learning rate (i.e. extent of increasing returns to 
adoption) is significantly higher than the 10% assumed here for the technologies 
characteristic of the 19th and 20th century global energy system. Or, the historical 
                                                                                                                                              
the evolution of technological complexity. 
 
The effects of increasing return ("learning") phenomena on the econo
technological systems are well established and important in our simulatio
Figure 8). However, the effects of increasing returns on energy systems c
variety need also attention. On one hand, evidently the economic b
increased reliance on a few key technologies that exhibit increasing return
are substantial (a factor of more than 100 in our simulations, cf. Figure 
the corresponding lower level of technological complexity could also h
benefits as well (lower vulnerability to disruptions of interconnec
technologies and energy chains). However, lower complexity also means 
the system and thus increased vulnerability in
conditions or the selection environment. It remains an open research ques
weigh the respective economic benefits of increasing returns with the 
disadvantages of less complexity and variety due to the increasing 
alternative technologies and of technological combinations. 
 
Even with a stylized and simplified model, we nonetheless offer a final o
may be useful in directing future research into the historical evolut
systems. In our baseline simulations we 
doubling of cumulative output). Combined with our assumed rate of appe
technologies and the resulting propensity for new combinations to
simulations suggest both many alternative development pathways and 
little pre-mature technological lock-in (at least in the first 150 years of ou
which is in stark contrast to the historical record.  
 
This contrast between the model simulations of many possible developm
the history of energy systems “lock-in” lends itself to two possible i
Either, history is indeed an almost random realization of many potent
histories that could have unfolded under a different combination of 
events. Or, alternatively, the historical record of technological "lock-in" 
combustion/electricity dominated one in the 20th) suggests that historical
model assumptions do not hold. Either the rate of appearance of innovatio
discontinuous and cluste
 
learning rates of 1% and 3% respectively. As mentioned above, learning rates are treated as 
uncertain, however we have not varied the uncertainty surrounding learning rates in this 
sensitivity analysis, just the mean. 
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record is a result of a combination of both phenomena, a hypothesis which we suggest 
as worth exploring further in future studies. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Complexification of the simulated global energy system (av
simulations each) as a function of varying characteristics of technolog
and of the selection environment. The scenarios shown include: base li
(with parameters set as given in Appendix A and B), lower learning r
increasing returns to adoption), changing the rate of emergence of new
(low and high introduction rates), reducing 
erage of 200 
ical evolution 
ne simulation 
ates (smaller 
 technologies 
"innovation patience" (i.e. the retention rate 
of new technologies in the system to allow for emerging new combinations) parameter 
from 500 years (base line) to 20 and 5 years respectively, and finally, exclusion of 
“backstop” technologies. The biggest impact on technological complexity results from 
varying the "innovation patience" parameter, followed by learning rates, and the 
availability of backstops. Conversely, the impact of varying the rate by which 
innovations emerge (i.e. are randomly drawn out of a pre-defined "pool" of potential 
technology-knowledge base) is comparatively limited. 
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 Figure 7. Effects of different learning rates on technological complexification for 200 
simulations with 500 time steps each. Note in particular the decrease in complexity in 
the high learning (baseline) case. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Energy systems costs for two different learning rate scenarios for 200 
simulations with 500 time steps each. Note in particular the two orders of magnitude 
difference in energy systems costs between the two learning rate scenarios at the end of 
the simulation time period. 
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 3.4. Innovation impatience, recharge, and "forgetting by not doing" 
is discovered, 
 for new (re-
 are, however, 
istence of new 
vailable to be 
cation. Given 
 level of aggregation of our simulation model, we cannot meaningfully 
 
time" in the 
of the entire 
eir production 
crets were so 
that the technology actually never diffused outside the original innovation 
roduction is no 
ht indeed be 
mist Gerhard 
ur model. We 
ologies in the system from 
ctively, again 
 above. For an 
case of laser, 
ration into the 
 
One of the key variables in our (re-)combinatorial evolutionary model of energy 
technologies and systems is the assumption that once a technology 
knowledge about it will persist and hence this technology is available
)combinations into the technological landscape quasi indefinitely. There
reasons to challenge this assumption. First, evidently even given the ex
technological knowledge by someone somewhere does not mean it is a
integrated into the technological landscape by someone else at another lo
however the high
address this issue of actor and spatial heterogeneity here. However, we can look at the
impacts of relaxing our assumption on the "innovation retention 
technological system. 
 
The historical record of technologies provides many examples 
disappearance of technologies along with the associated knowledge for th
and use. The famous Sheffield (crucible) steel, whose manufacturing se
well guarded 
center (Tweedale, 1986), no longer exists and the tacit knowledge of its p
longer available. 11  Thus the corollary of "learning-by-doing" mig
"forgetting-by-not-doing" (an adage attributed to the technology econo
Rosegger [1991]). 
 
Exploring the effects of "forgetting-by-not-doing" is straightforward in o
simply vary the "retention time" of newly emerging techn
quasi infinite (500 time steps) down to 20 and 5 time steps respe
performing 200 simulations, whose averages are summarized in Figure 6
empirical interpretation of our "retention time" variable, consider the 
where several decades passed before an actual application (i.e. an integ
existing technology system) of this scientific breakthrough was found. 
 
Reducing the innovation "patience" (time) to 5 simulation time steps 
indeed drastic impact on lowering technological complexity. Too little 
allow for technologies to combine, chains to be integrated, for bootstr
system in general. The end result is an almost entire lack of evolution of t
(years) has an 
time is left to 
apping of the 
he system and 
an extremely low level of complexity. Even considering a retention time of 20 time 
eless observe 
stems costs as 
rtance of innovation 
"patience" preserving technological innovation diversity much like biological diversity, 
as diversity is the ultimate resource from which new combinations and changing 
practices can be built. Evidently important trade-offs are involved: the extra (current) 
                                                
steps (years) that would otherwise be considered generous, we noneth
reduced complexity levels of about one fourth (and with higher energy sy
well). The conclusion from our simulations is to highlight the impo
 
11
 Another example of “lost" technology is Tang San Cai, Tri-color Glazed Pottery, a gem of 
ancient Chinese art, which reached its peak during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), in order to 
entirely disappear under the Song Dynasty (960-1279), cf. see Wang and Zhang (2006). 
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costs of preserving technological diversity (innovation patience) need to
with (unknown) 
 be contrasted 
future benefits from a larger innovation “gene” pool that nurtures 
ncreasing the 
r and become 
 system. In a 
(or rather the 
of that of the 
two scenarios. 
uite counter-
technological 
 the effect of 
e generic for 
ion. From an 
ant how much 
he continuous 
 in our model) -- provided 
technological change. 
 
Finally, we have also examined the implications of lowering or i
innovation rate, i.e. the rate at which random new technologies appea
available as potential new building blocks for an ever evolving energy
sensitivity analysis we have lowered and increased the introduction 
random sampling) rate of new technologies to 10 percent or 200 percent 
baseline simulation and again carried out 200 simulations for each of the 
The effect is noticeable in Figure 6 above, albeit asymmetrically. Q
intuitively, lowering the innovation rate has a bigger impact on 
complexity, than increasing it, but in both cases it is less drastic than
lowering the innovation retention time. If this pattern would indeed b
technological systems, it would suggest a quite stark policy conclus
evolutionary perspective of technological complexity, it is far less import
resources are used as input to the innovation process (that produce t
"recharge" of innovations assumed as an exogenous variable
that it is maintained. Instead, far more important is to assure innovation 
avoiding knowledge depreciation or forgetting-by-not-doing for extend
time in order to increase the chances that new solutions can ultimately be c
new system components and integrated into the technological landscape.12
 
Perhaps, the most drastic model experiment on technological recharge
sensitivity analyses on the implications of the unavailability of our combi
energy systems backstop technologies under the collective name "solfus". As 
progressive resource depletion sets in, energy prices soar, which in turn 
rate of introduction of new technologies and of combinations at least tem
all simulations performed, this resource constrained system without lon
alternatives (the backstops) turns out to be the most complex in the m
(reaching a complexity peak some 50 time steps after the baseline simu
more than twice its level (cf. Figure 6 above). This increasing complexity
to the absence of "lock-out" effects of the 
"patience", i.e. 
ed periods of 
ombined into 
 
 is to conduct 
ned long-term 
accelerate the 
porarily. From 
g-term viable 
edium term 
lations and at 
 is simply due 
backstop technologies as well as the 
enormous energy price increases associated with progressive resource depletion. Our 
simulations illustrate a basic feature of technological innovation: Even embracing an 
induced innovation perspective, in which innovativeness responds to economic and 
ier innovation 
he absence of 
at cannot find 
                                                
policy signals, this potential response only materializes in case earl
"recharge" replenishes the pool of potential technological solutions. In t
innovation recharge, induced innovation triggers a frantic search, but th
new solutions as these have not been generated previously. 
 
 
12
 Using the popular (even if imperfect) metaphor of the "valley of death" of technological 
innovation our findings suggest that R&D expenditures are less important than keeping the 
outputs of the innovation process "alive" to allow for emerging new combinations. As the above 
metaphor suggests, nurturing a technological "baby" (innovation through R&D) might be quite 
useless if later on it is left to peril in the valley of death where the innovation does not find any 
commercial applications. 
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3.5. Gales of Creative Destruction  
 energy chains 
e is also death 
s or chains as 
tions, these in 
growth, also 
s "fading out" 
 of creative 
logies that can 
me point in time 
"gales of creative destruction" will become more prevalent than the technological 
ing" 13  and 
cal systems. 
er of primary 
ologies exiting the system, killed 
erging 
n spurts, also 
les of creative 
es mirror the 
ive advantages 
e step 150, the 
gly determined 
ffects, but again technological 
xit" proceeds discontinuously much like "entry". This clustering effect of 
technological "exits" is best visible for individual simulations (shown for simulation run 
150 at the bottom panel of Figure 9, as the top panel summarizes all technological exits 
of our 200 simulations). These clustering effects in technology exit emerge from the 
twin evolutionary drivers modeled explicitly here: (deterministic) technological 
interdependence, as well as (uncertain) increasing returns to adoption. 
        
                                                
 
In symmetry to the recursive combinations of new technologies into new
that characterize the growth component of technological evolution, ther
that does not strike only individual technologies, but entire combination
well. As increasing returns to adoption favor new technological combina
turn will "squeeze out" existing combinations. Like technological 
technological death is characterized by non-linear, avalanche effects. Thi
of technological combinations represents the Schumpeterian "gales
destruction" in our simulation model. Since the number of new techno
eventually emerge is finite in our modeled technology system, at so
growth components that lead to increasing "conversion deepen
complexification. The end result is a decreasing complexity of technologi
 
Figure 9 summarizes all 200 simulations by showing the total numb
technologies in use as well as the total number of techn
by competition of newer technologies and technological combinations. Like em
technological combinations and systems complexification that come i
exiting technologies exhibit discontinuous rates and clustering, i.e. ga
destruction, albeit for different reasons at different periods in time.  
 
Prior to simulation time step 150, increasing death rates of technologi
ascent of more competitive technological combinations, whose competit
evolve non-linearly due to increasing returns. After about simulation tim
mortality of technologies and of technological combinations is increasin
by resource depletion effects in addition to innovation e
"e
 
13
 Conversion deepening refers to the increasing lengthening of energy chains, which is one of 
the two components of technological complexification (in addition to the emergence of ever 
larger number of energy chains). 
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 Figure 9. Number of technologies squeezed out versus number of technologies in use, 
total number of primary technologies in use and exiting the system, totaled over 200 
 discontinuous nature of technology death is illustrated on 
the bottom panel for an illustrative simulations (Sim36) showing the number of primary 
gress. Note in 
200, and 250-
ot lead to the 
conclusion that the "lifetime" of technologies in our system is short. Rather our model 
simulations indicate the contrary (Figure 10). When analyzing the cumulative 
distribution of the number of simulation steps/years technologies stay active in the 
system almost all technologies exhibit a quite surprising degree of longevity. For the 
base case simulations with higher learning rates, 80% of all primary technologies stay in 
the system for more than 50 years (simulation time steps), and in the low learning rate 
simulations with their significantly higher levels of technological complexity, around 
95% of primary technologies stay in the system for more than 50 years. By allowing 
market share growth rates to be as large as possible in another 200 simulations, we 
simulations (top panel). The
technologies exiting the energy system as the simulation time steps pro
particular the "clustering" of the exit of technologies at time step 100, 
270: Gales of creative destruction. 
 
3.6. Methusalem technologies 
 
The above discussion of technological mortality and "exits" should n
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found that still around 70% of the technologies stay in the system for 
yea
more than 50 
rs. 
 
Life time distributions of all 200 simulations 
 
Life time distributions of average of 200 simulations 
 
Figure 10. Active life of primary technologies: Cumulative probability distribution  for 
ng rates, and 
hnologies and 
 distributions 
narios. 
y system, it is 
t likely that it will stay there for a long period of time which adds an important 
element of technological inertia slowing down radical systems transformations. Our 
results are in conformity with the characteristic rates of global energy systems 
transformations that typically take 7 decades up to a century to fully unfold (Marchetti 
and Nakicenovic, 1979, Grubler et al., 1999). Accelerated rates of radical systems 
changes and transformation beyond historical experience appear thus only possible if an 
explicit policy mechanism of Schumpeterian "gales of creative destruction" can be 
found. 
 
base line with high learning rates, sensitivity runs with low learni
sensitivity runs without limitation on market share growth of new tec
technological combinations (i.e. on instantaneous "flip-over"). Summary
are for all primary technologies for 200 simulations each for the three sce
 
These results suggest that once a technology is introduced into the energ
mos
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3.7. Environmental uncertainty: Carbon emissions and uncertain carbon-  
       taxes influencing the technological selection environment 
ecognized as a 
i et al., 2007). 
 illustrate both 
tal regulation 
duct of levels 
vels of energy 
ons, we focus below on an analysis of the 
carbon intensity of primary energy as most succinct variable illustrating the different 
tive 
entical initial 
is substantial 
y technologies 
e described a 
lining carbon 
 be cautious: 
on neutral" in 
s little warranted from a 
rsistent trends 
carbonization" 
a tax is phased 
me step 50 at a range of initial starting values, in order to increase 
ean growth of 
of varying the 
t comes as no 
 higher 
is the assumed carbon tax. 
 
g, peaking and 
 levels, although 
peak levels as well as peak timing are responsive (i.e. occur at lower levels and earlier) 
to increasing carbon taxes. Apparently, the systems advantages of fossil fuel 
technologies substituting traditional biomass use14 and technologies (in terms of energy 
                                                
    
Of all environmental externalities, energy-related carbon emissions are r
major source of past as well as future climate change (IPCC, 2007; Riah
As carbon emissions are endogenously calculated in our simple model we
their uncertainty as well as their (uncertain) response to environmen
(modeled here via an uncertain carbon tax). Carbon emissions are the pro
of primary energy use times the carbon intensity of primary energy. As le
use are very different across our 200 simulati
degrees of environmental climate change externalities associated with the alterna
energy systems emerging from our evolutionary model.  
 
As in our previous simulation results, the uncertainty, even given id
conditions as well as potential suite of primary technologies available, 
(Figure 11) as a result of alternative evolutionary combinations of energ
and chains. When comparing our results with historical studies that hav
slow, but steady "decarbonization" of global energy systems (i.e. a dec
intensity, cf. Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1996) readers are advised to
Following standard practice, we have modeled biomass energies as "carb
our base-line simulations here, an assumption that seem
historical perspective. Including biomass carbon emissions increases our carbon 
intensity across all simulations (right panel in Figure 11) and shows a pe
toward "decarbonization" as the energy system evolves. The mean "de
rate of the average of our 200 simulation is around 0.3 percent per time step (year), in 
line with the historical record when including biomass carbon emissions. 
 
Next we analyze the impact of adding a carbon tax. We assume that such 
in after simulation ti
thereafter at an average rate of 2 percent/year, roughly in line with the m
energy demand across our simulations. Figure 12 illustrates the impact 
carbon tax from initial levels of 10, 20, 50, 100, and 200 $/tC respectively (while 
always retaining the assumption of a 2%/yr growth rate in the tax level). I
surprise that the resulting carbon intensity of our energy system is the lower, the
What is less intuitive, is that the generic pattern of initially increasin
ultimately declining carbon intensity is unaffected by the different tax
 
14
 Biomass emissions are by accounting convention not included in our base line calculations of 
the carbon intensity -- hence the initially rising carbon intensities in Figures 11 (left panel)  and 
in Figure 12. 
 26
services rendered, efficiencies and costs) are so prevalent as to only be gradually 
influenced by a carbon tax, even at high levels. 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Carbon intensity of primary energy (in tons elemental carbon per kWyr 
ss as "carbon 
om biomass in 
l), mean and 
uency at each 
 
Our simulations suggest that even pricing in environmental externalities in form of a 
carbon tax as early as in the 19th century would not have essentially changed the course 
of the take-off of the Industrial Revolution, which appears primarily as technologically 
driven, i.e. by the creation of new technological combinations enabling new energy 
services and/or vastly improved efficiencies and costs of delivering traditional energy 
services as a result of technology improvements and increasing return phenomena. 
 
primary energy) in the 200 base line simulations considering bioma
neutral" (left panel) and in 200 simulations including the CO2 emission fr
the corresponding carbon intensity of the energy system (right pane
min/max of 200 simulations each. The color scheme denotes the freq
carbon intensity level across the simulations.  
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This conclusion on the technological "pre-ordainment" of the long-term e
energy system is corroborated by our simulation results on the influence o
on the aggregate level of complexity of the global energy system and the 
distribution of technological "
volution of the 
f a carbon tax 
corresponding 
lifetimes", i.e. years technologies remain in active use 
(Figure 13). 
 
  
 
Figure 12. Carbon intensities (mean across 200 simulations respectively, in tC/kWyr, 
assuming carbon neutrality for biomass) versus alternative carbon taxes (in $/tC), 
starting at various initial carbon tax levels (ICT at 10, 50, 100, and 200 $/tC 
respectively) at time step 50 and increasing with 2%/year thereafter. 
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 Life time distributions of all 200 simulations 
 
Life time distributions of average of 200 simulations 
Figure 13. Average of 200 simulations without (baseline) and with an initial carbon tax 
(ICT, starting at 200 $/tC at simulation time step 50 and increasing with 2%/yr 
thereafter): Technological systems complexity (average number of chains in use, left 
panel) and technological lifetime distribution (in years of active use of technologies 
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plotted as a density function of 200 simulations,upper panel) for the two scenarios. Note 
in particular only the gradual shift even in the case of a rather extreme carbon tax level.  
ologies in our 
its long-term 
in nonetheless 
 fundamental 
mensions and 
on. Rates of 
ations to allow 
integration of 
 technological 
divers. Unless 
ies (such as taxes) and these 
ng-term evolution of technological systems can be 
lt to argue for the sufficiency of such measures in 
In this paper we have developed an agent-based simulation model of the evolution of a 
. Our research 
ystem evolves 
 of systems 
 
 technologies, 
ponents of the 
hnologies that 
unctuated by 
isappear from 
rs: innovation 
the system; evolutionary endogenous traits in changing 
o adoption) as 
d here under 
ent, governing 
technological competition and ultimate technological senescence, interactions with 
demand, as well as due to exogenous constraints such as resource depletion, or carbon 
taxes. Despite its stylized nature and many simplifications, our model nonetheless 
provides a number of important insights. 
 
One of the most intriguing findings from our simulations is the degree of chance and 
serendipity characterizing the evolution of our simulated technology system. With 
identical initial conditions, identical suite of potential technologies that can emerge (be 
 
Even when changing the economics of the selection environment of techn
evolutionary model of the global energy system (via a carbon tax), 
characteristics in term of complexity and life spans of technologies rema
largely unchanged. This result is less surprising considering that the
systems dynamics of technological evolution encompass many more di
variables beyond influencing the economics of technology adopti
emergence of new technologies (innovations), "residence" time of innov
for an ultimate "discovery" of technological linkages and hence 
innovations into large technical systems, as well as the natural rhythms of
obsolescence and "gales of creative destruction" remain as fundamental 
clear linkages between economic environmental polic
fundamental drivers of the lo
established, it appears difficu
triggering much needed large-scale technological transitions.  
4. Summary and Conclusion 
 
large and complex technological system using the example of energy
objective was to improve our understanding on how such a complex s
from "within", bootstrapping itself, evolving into ever higher levels
complexity. 
A distinguishing and novel feature of our model is that our "agents" are
while the model preserves innovation and economic drivers as main com
evolutionary algorithm underlying a continued re-combination of tec
result in an "organic" build-up of novel systems structures, p
Schumpeterian "gales of creative destruction".  
 
Technologies in our model emerge, combine, compete, and ultimately d
the technological landscape under a combination of interacting drive
emergence and retention time in 
technological characteristics (most notably uncertain increasing returns t
well as in the morphology of the technological landscape summarize
"complexification"; and finally the evolution of the selection environm
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discovered), and identical technological and economic characteristics o
and drivers (e.g. technology costs, energy service demands), nonethe
system's structures emerge across the simulations. Alternative historie
unfold in different simulations providing ample illustrations of path de
technological "lock-in". This feature of bifurcation and path-dependence
the stochastic nature of the inn
f technologies 
less different 
s and futures 
pendence and 
 as a result of 
ovation process combined with a random walk model of 
terogeneity in 
s a powerful 
either unfold 
changes in the 
nd survival or 
a "complexity 
energy chains 
line thereafter. 
f recursive combinations of technologies, whereas 
via "crowding 
-run resource 
 technological 
complexity is 
n lead to both 
s structure in 
s complexity 
 technological combinations forge ahead, out-competing alternatives that then 
ulations 
ertain tension 
ed costs) and 
ight increase 
 of the systems to external shocks or changes in the selection 
ent 
binations and 
 exhibit also 
rian "gales of 
creative destruction".  
In terms of the evolution of systems complexity our simulation results suggest 
asymmetrical, non-linear responses to a) varying the rate of emergence of innovations 
and b) their rate of the retention in the system to allow for the emergence of new 
technological combinations. Lowering the innovation introduction rate below base-line 
values drastically lowers systems complexity; whereas increasing the introduction rates 
drastically above base line values has only a gradual effect. Conversely, the single most 
important variable for system complexity in our model is "innovation patience", i.e. the 
increasing returns to adoption is a dynamic behavior that to our knowledge has not been 
described in any energy model to date. 
 
Another insight provided by our model simulations is that despite he
alternative development pathways, the system is characterized by a persistent pattern 
towards increasing complexity. However, while complexification i
tendency, the simulations reveal as well that complexification does n
indefinitely, nor that it is preordained, as levels of complexity respond to 
evolutionary environment governing technology selection, competition, a
exit. An invariable pattern emerging from our simulations is that of 
peak". Whereas initially technological complexity in terms of number of 
in use increases, it reaches a peak around time step 150, in order to dec
Increasing complexity is the result o
decreasing complexity is the result of “lock-out” effects of technologies 
out" due to increasing returns of newer competing technologies. Long
depletion ultimately leads to drastically reduced system's complexity or to
"denudation" as Harrison Brown has called it. 
 
A powerful mechanism in our model that influences technological 
increasing returns to adoption (technological learning), that however ca
complexification and/or simplification depending on the timing and system
our model simulations. Generally, increasing returns tend to lower system
as certain
gradually disappear. System's complexity tends therefore to be higher in sim
that assume low increasing returns. Our model results thus suggest a c
between the desirable effects of increasing returns (e.g. drastically lower
potential negative effects, such as lowered technological diversity that m
the vulnerability
environment. 
 
In both complexification as well as simplification of technology systems, developm
pathways are far from gradual and smooth. Emerging technological com
systems complexification come in spurts, and exiting technologies
discontinuous rates with clustering and avalanche effects: Schumpete
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time new innovations remain in the system (even if not yet integrated into
chains) and during which new combinations can emerge. The evolution of
terms of complexity responds mo
 viable energy 
 our system in 
st dramatically to a lowering of this innovation 
 much of the 
An important 
 short periods 
ovation efforts 
 an additional 
ger long-term 
 more critical 
novation diversity.  Sustained
"residence" (or innovation "patience") time. 
 
The policy implications of above findings are interesting, as extending
current debate on technology policy in a climate constrained world. 
conclusion from our model simulations is that random perturbations over
of time have little long-lasting effects. Even increasing systematically inn
above a critical baseline innovation "recharge" (R&D) level, e.g. through
R&D effort of the size of the Apollo Project, is unlikely to trig
bifurcations in energy systems. Instead our simulations suggest a much
role for innovation "patience" that preserves in  and 
 spurts even if cumulative R&D efforts appear to be more important than shorter-term
very high. Much like in biology, technological diversity is the ultimate 
which new combinations and changing practices can be built. 
 
Our simulations have also revealed a surprising longevity of individual tec
of technological combinations. Its main influencing variables are th
increasing returns to adoption (that accelerate "crowding out" of technologies
as accelerated rates of market penetration (i.e. removing the effects f
learning und persistent uncertainty that lead only to cautious and gradu
new technologies in our model
resource from 
hnologies and 
e degrees of 
) as well 
rom localized 
al adoption of 
se stay in the 
ed. This is a 
tems (Grubler 
dical systems 
changes beyond historical experience appear thus possible less from the "cradle" end of 
ather from the 
ective of this 
sible if an 
ction" can be 
 two important 
ency towards 
s that emerge 
ously in our model without external constraints. Evidently, both 
absolute emissions as well as emission intensities are highly uncertain, reflecting the 
merging from 
arbon tax) has 
ies, but only a gradual effect on 
systems complexity and longevity of technologies. Thus, it appears difficult to argue 
that economic policy signals alone will result in a drastic transformation of the energy 
technology landscape. 
                                                
15). 70% to 95% of all technologies in u
system for more than 50 years across all sensitivity analyses perform
theoretical corroboration of the observed slow turnover rates in energy sys
et al., 1999) that exceed well over 5 decades. Accelerated rates of ra
the technology life cycle (innovation rates and increasing returns) but r
"grave" end, i.e. the exit of technologies from the system. From the persp
modeling exercise, accelerated systems transformation would only be pos
explicit policy mechanism of Schumpeterian "gales of creative destru
found.  
 
Finally, with respect to environmental issues, our simulations provide for
conclusions. First, in all simulations there is a powerful tend
"decarbonization", i.e. a decrease in the carbon intensity of energy system
entirely endogen
multitude of alternative pathways and technological combinations e
different simulations. Pricing in environmental externalities (through a c
an important effect on emissions and carbon intensit
 
15
  This is the most significant difference in the technology dynamics between our model when 
compared to deterministic models that display instantaneous technological "turn-overs" (usually 
moderated by exogenous market penetration constraints in the models). 
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 Our simulation modeling results indicate both important areas of future re
as the need to enlarge the environmental policy "tool kit" in a climate con
in the direction of targeted technology measures both at the "cradle" as
"grave" of technological life cycles. How to trigger accelerated innovation efforts, 
increased innovation "patience", as well as speedier retirement of old, 
capital vintages and infrastructure
search as well 
strained world 
 well as at the 
but long-lived 
s and how to weigh costs and benefits of such 
technology measures might indeed the most challenging, but also most fruitful, avenues 
 research in a warming world. 
 The Dynamics 
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Appendix  A – Main Mathematical Formulations of the Model 
 link 
primary energy 
 
Suppose an energy chain (i.e. a combination of [conversion] technologies enabling to
primary resources to demands for energy services) is composed of n 
technologies (defined here in analogy to activity/process analysis at the level of an industrial 
plant [facility]). We number the technologies from the end to the beginning of an energy chain 
as 1, 2, … n. The cost of the chain can be calculated as Eq. (1)               
  ii
i
i
j
jeff 1 1
where t  denotes the me step of the simulation, tC  denotes the total cost of the chain for
producing on
t
n
t ecC  1 ,                                              (1) 
ti  
e unit output at step ,  (energy input-output) efficiency of 
technolog
t jeff denotes the 
y j , tic  denotes the le gy at stepvellized cost of technolo  i t ,   denotes the carbon tax 
ucing each unit 
 
levels according 
) is modeled as a function of its 
cu ulative output. With technological learning effects, a technology’s levellized cost will 
decrease with an increase of cumulative output. Technological learning rates are treated as 
uncertain, with random values around a mean assu or old) and 30% 
al distributions.  
culate
per emission (US$/ct), and ie  denotes the emission of technology i  for prod
output (tC/kWyr).  
 
Cost are dynamic in our model via increasing returns to adoption, i.e. technological learning,
that are calculated at the primary technology level and then aggregated to chain 
to Eq. (1). A primary technology’s learning rate (cost reductions
m
med learning rate of 10% (f
(for new technologies) respectively, with uncertainties characterized by lognorm
Thus a technology’s levellized cost at time t , tic , can be cal d as Eq. (2) 
    ibtiiti Icc  0 ,                                              (2) 
where  ib  is a random value with   den ity space that is 
charact  by a lognormal distribution, 
oting an element from a probabil
erized  ib2  is the progress ratio ( ib 21 is the learning 
rate) of technology i , 0ic  is the initial cost of technology i , and tiI  is the cum
output of technology i  at step t , and  
 
ulative installed 
 tj jiti II 0 ,                                                         (3) 
where is the installed output of technology  at stepjiI   i j . In our model, technology outputs at 
a certain time step depend on the evolution energy service demands. It is possible that a 
technology is deployed as a component in several different energy chains for satisfying final 
energy service demands. in this case is the sum acities required in each chain at 
step 
of 
j
iI  of output cap
j . 
 35
   
For the dynamics of the final energy service demands, we assumed an exogenou
for the economy, say, income, with each demand category having a fixed inco
s increasing rate 
me elasticity. A 
demand is also influenced by the price/cost for satisfying it. According to the definition of price 
elasticity, it is easy to get Eq. (4) which describes the dynamics of energy service demands. 
         tipitii iiiitiiti pepe pepedd    1111 11          
where tid  and 
1t
id denote the demand for energ service i  at step t  and 1
p
tptp  11                         (4) 
y t , r
and 1tip  are energy service i ’s prices at t  and 1
espectively; tip  t  , respectively; i  is an exogenous 
 of the demand for energy is price elasticity of dema
ous and part
 
ervice demand is calculated by weighted average cost of 
viable chains which can provide the energy service required (we ignore mark-ups and profits in 
our simple model).  Suppose at step  there a emand i, and  
  is the share of each chain at step , and  is the cost of chain 
increasing rate  service i , and pie  nd for 
ly energy service i . With Eq. (4), the dynamics of demands are partly exogen
endogenous in our model. 
The price for satisfying a final energy s
t , re h  viable chains for satisfying d hjstj ,1 t tjC j ,  then the 
. (5
.                                                        (5) 
price of energy service i  is calculated as Eq ) h ttj
Chain 
 jjti Csp
1
j ’s share before normalization in the next step 1ˆ tjs  is calculated according to Eq (6)    


   ti
t
j
t
it
j
t
j p
Cp
ss ,max1ˆ 1     01   .                              
T
                       (6) 
he reason why is introduced in Eq. (6) is to prevent negative market shares. With Eq. (5) and 
Eq. (6), the growth/decrease of a viable chain’s market share is not only governed by the 
difference between its cost and the weighted average cost (the price variable in our model), but 
also governed by its current market share since its current share is used as a weight for 
calculating the price in Eq (5). With Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), the sum of all viable chains’ shares for 
a demand should be more or less than one. In addition, there could be new formed viable chains 
which will get an initially small market share. So we need to normalize viable chains as in Eq. 
(7)  
 t
 
 



 







chains  viableformed newfor 
ˆ
chains  viableexistingfor 
ˆ
ˆ
1
1
1
1
1
1
h
k
t
k
h
k
t
k
t
j
t
j
hs
hs
s
s

  hhj ,,1             (7) ,   
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where hdenotes the number of new formed viable chains, and   is a small number assigned to 
y. 
ket shares for a 
dema pper o ower limit on the change of 
relative market shares. But we can adjust 
a new formed viable chain which thus will have an initial small market share onl
Since every chain’s share is always normalized the sum of all viable chains mar
nd equals 1 (i.e. 100%), so we can not set the exact u r l  to control the market share dynamics, e.g.  
9.0  allows for bigger market share gains per simulation step than 1.0 . 
 
In our simulations, we assume resource depletion, ources increases 
with cumulative extraction. For resource i, its extra ted as Eq. (8)   
i.e. the cost of extracting res
ction cost at time t  is calcula
i
t
iE
i
t
iR
 718.2 ,                                               (8) 
where i  and  i  are model parameters. i  is the initial extraction cost of technology i and i  
governs the speed of increase of  technology i’s extraction cost. tE  is the cumulative extraction i
of resource i by step t , and j 1
where jiE  denotes the extraction of resource i at time t . 
 
The number of drawing and com
 t jiti EE ,                                               (9) 
binations of technologies/chains at each step is a combined 
function of the size of the economy and the resulting demand for energy services, treated as 
exogenous in our model, and also a functio ogenous in our 
model. For the illustrative simulations reported here we simply assume that energy service 
demands grow at an annual rate of 2%, roughly in line with the long-term global growth rate in 
n of energy prices (which are end
final energy demand.    mmi titit pdMinN 001 25000                                             i ii pd1,               (10) 
where   is a model parameter, tid and tip denote demand and price of energy ser
and 0id and
0
ip denote demand and price of energy service i at time 0, and m den
of various final energy service demands. 25000 is considered sufficiently large
of draws. If we do not add this upper 
vice i at time
otes the num
 for the num
limit, the  might be very big slowing down the 
simulation beyond practical limits.  
 
At each draw, the probability of success is assumed to be 
 t , 
ber 
ber 
tN
  
ly
which means at each draw, the 
probability of the emergence of a new technology (random  out from the “technology base” 
until the “technology base” is empty) is . Any new technologies or combinations will stay in 
the system for potential further comb  use forination or    time steps (which is a parameter used 
to represent innovation [im-]patience in our model). 
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Appendix B – The Reference Energy System 
d global energy 
information can 
st” denotes the 
CO2 Emission” 
theses refer to 
are balanced by 
 biomass growth if produced sustainably. In the default model simulations we 
simply assume the carbon neutrality of biomass over all simulation time steps, but equally 
. when resulting 
le 1 denotes the 
technology will 
 then there is no 
ts); if LBD = 1, 
D = 2, then the 
(mean of 30% cost decline per doubling of cumulative 
pletion function 
chnologies with 
e 3 times larger 
vels – resource, 
s, and “useful” 
The reason why 
h additional three levels is that for the same energy form energy vectors are treated 
 codes “0 3”, “1 
gas available in 
available at the 
o locations for 
can be used for 
 chain, e.g. from hydrogen (H2) to electricity and then from electricity 
e level, i.e. the 
antial economic 
ns. 
onal conversion 
lausible. Consider for instance the case where hydrogen would be used for 
electricity storage. We plan to include such circular chains and the need for energy storage in 
future extensions of our model.) 
 
Table 3 summarizes the values of parameters related to the demand for energy services (Eq. 4), 
resource depletion (Eq. 8), and number of technology draws and combinations (Eq. 10) used in 
our base case model simulation and Table 4 summarized our assumptions on upper resource 
extraction limits for renewable resources. Finally, Table 5 summarizes other salient parameters 
used for the reported here. 
 
 
 
Table 1 gives the details of the 62 primary energy technologies in our simplifie
system. The “Input ID” and “Ouput ID” are denoted by codes whose detailed 
be found in Table 2. “Efficiency” denotes the ratio of output per unit input. “Co
levellized cost assumed for a technology for generating a unit “Output”. “
denotes the CO2 emitted when generating a unit “Output”. (Values in paren
biomass CO2 emissions as occurring at the point of energy conversion, but that 
CO2 uptake from
document the model simulations for not assuming carbon neutral biomasss [e.g
from deforestation].)  
 
The 62 primary technologies are classified into three groups. “Group ID” in Tab
group they belong to. “Group” assignment also roughly determines when a 
become available. “LBD” denotes the technological learning effect. If LBD = 0,
learning effect (and the only dynamic cost influence are resource depletion effec
then the technology has a relatively low learning rate (mean of 10%); and if LB
technology has a high learning rate 
output).  The costs of extraction technologies are governed by the resource de
(Eq. 8 in Appendix A) with different parameter values shown in Table 3.  For te
learning potential (LBD = 1 or 2), their initial levellized cost are assumed to b
than the levellized costs shown in Table 1.        
  
Table 2 gives the details of energy forms. Energy forms are clustered into five le
primary, secondary, final and useful energy. “Resource” means natural resource
describes the final energy service demands expressed at the useful energy level. 
we distinguis
differently in the model and thus need specific designations.  For example, the
3”, “2 4”, “3 5” denote – the same energy currency – gas. But “0 3” denotes the 
nature, “1 3” denotes the gas extracted from nature; “2 4” denotes the gas 
locations for further processing; and “3 5” denotes the gas transported int
providing the final energy services, for example, gas in residential housing that 
heating purposes. 
  
For a new circular energy
again back to produce H2 (here H2 and electricity are modeled at the sam
secondary energy level), we set its share to 0, because of the intrinsic subst
penalty associated with the incurred conversion losses when compared to simpler linear chai
(In real technology systems obviously, such circular chains and their additi
losses are entirely p
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Table 1. Definition of the 62 prim  energy technologies in the reference energy system. 
 
me
n
ut 
ID
Output
 Efficiency
Level z
st 
(US$/kWyr
CO2 
ons
16
(tC/kWyr) 
Group
ID LBD
ary
ID Na  Description 
I p
ID
li ed E
Co
)
missi
 
1 Coal e 30 0 0 xtr Coal extraction 0 1 2 1 1 0 
2 Oil ex x i 40 0 0 tr (Crude) oil e tract on 0 2 1 2 1 0 
3 Gas extr Natural gas ex ti 45 0 0 trac on 0 3 2 4 1 0 
4 Bio ex tra   0 0 tr Biomass ex ction 0 4 2 6 1 10 0 
5 Ura extr Uranium extraction 0 5 0 0 0 2 7 1 2.5 
6 Oil refi Crude oil refin     32 2 1 ing 1 2 2 3 0.95 37 0.0
7 Gas bio Gas from biomass   8 (0.580) 2 1 2 6 2 4 0.75 32
8 Eth bi  bioma   3 (0.489) 2 1 o Ethanol from ss 2 6 2 5 0.56 62
9 Met coal Methanol from a   7 03 2 1  co l 2 1 2 2 0.65 54 0.4
10 Gas c m coal   7 51 2 1 oal Gas fro 2 1 2 4 0.75 39 0.4
11 Met gas Methanol from 2 4 0.041 2 1  gas 2 2 0.7 319 
12 Coal p ower pl   2 14 2 1 pl Coal p ant 2 1 2 8 0.38 61 0.8
13 Coal h   14 2 1 2 H2 from coal 2 1 2 9 0.7 512 0.8
14 Oil pp pla   31 2 1 l Oil power nt 2 3 2 8 0.4 375 0.6
15 Gas p a  82 2 1 pl Gas power pl nt 2 4 2 8 0.45 366 0.4
16 Gas h as  82 2 1 2 H2 from g 2 4 2 9 0.8 227 0.4
17 Bio p we a  (0.942) 2 1 pl Biomass po r pl nt 2 6 2 8 0.33 591 
18 Bio h  biom  (0.942) 2 1 2 H2 from ass 2 6 2 9 0.7 422 
19 Nuc ppl Nuclear powe n  013 2 1 r pla t 2 7 2 8 0.33 1 0 
20 Nuc h
ear 
2 7 0 3 1 2 
H2 from nucl
power 2 9 0.7 1153 
21 Sol ppl Solar power plant 0 8 2 8 0.4 4338 0 3 1 
22 Sol H2 H2 from solar 0 8 2 9 0.6 1496 0 3 2 
23 Wind ppl Wind power plant 0 6 2 8 0.4 3850 0 2 1 
24 Hydr ppl Hydro power plant 0 7 2 8 0.4 886 0 2 1 
25 FC 
H2 power pl. (fuel 
cell) 2 9 2 8 0.7 2346 0 3 2 
                                                 
16
 Emission factors in parenthesis refer to biomass whose emissions can be considered either 
as carbon neutral (i.e. zero) or be included alongside fossil fuel emissions (values) in the model. 
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ID Nam cripti
ut Output
 Efficiency
Levellized 
Cost 
(U /kWy
CO2 
Emissions
16
 
(tC/kWyr) 
Group
ID LBDe Des on 
Inp
ID ID S$ r)
26 Nuc fus Nuclear fusion 0 9 0 3 1  2 8 0.4 4338 
27 Elec H  2 1 2 H2 from electricity 2 8 2 9 0.95 172 0 
28 Coal t   2 1 /d Coal T&D17 2 1 3 1 0.95 60 0 
29 Met t/ anol T&D   60 2 1 d Meth  2 2 3 2 0.98 0 
30 Oilp t ucts T&D  60 2 1 /d Oil prod 2 3 3 3 0.98 0 
31 Gas t/  2 1 d Gas T&D 2 4 3 5 0.72 122 0 
32 Eth t/d Ethanol T&D 2 5 60 0 2 1 3 6 0.98 
33 Bio t/ mass T&D   1 0 d Bio  2 6 3 7 1 20 0 
34 Elec t tricity T&  6 2 1 /d Elec D 2 8 3 4 0.85 39 0 
35 H2 t/d H2 T&D 2 9 3 8 0 2 2 1 .935 15 0 
36 Oil la  0.05  31 2 1 m Oil lamp 3 3 4 1 30 0.6
37 Gas la   30 82 2 1 m Gas lamp 3 5 4 1 0.05 0.4
38 Coal lam Coal illumination 3 1 0.01 0.814 2 1 4 1 60 
39 Bio la m io   (0.942) 1 0 m Biomass illu inat n 3 7 4 1 0.02 2
40 Bulb ht bulb 3 4 4 1 0.05 403 0 2 2 Electric lig
41 Coal fur Coal furnace (heat) 3 1 0.814 2 1 4 3 0.50 30 
42 Oil fur Oil furnace (heat) 3 3 4 3 0.75 30 31 2 1 0.6
43 Gas fu  (h   30 82 2 1 r Gas furnace eat) 3 5 4 3 0.75 0.4
44 Bio fu
s furna
)   (0.942) 1 0 r (heat
Biomas ce 
3 7 4 3 0.1 10
45 H2 fu rnace (h  4 2 1 r H2 fu eat) 3 8 4 3 1 120 0 
46 Ele H  heat (direct) 3 4 0 2 1 eat Electric 4 3 1 30 
47 Elec H eat p 2 1 P Electric h ump 3 4 4 3 3 602 0 
48 Ste eng Steam engine 3 1 4 4 0.1 2422 0.814 2 1 
49 Oil eng Oil engine 3 3 4 4 0.1 7785 0.631 2 1 
50 Gas eng Gas engine 3 5 4 4 0.1 7785 0.482 2 1 
51 Animal 
Draft animals 
(transp.) 3 7 4 4 0.04 10000 (0.942) 1 0 
52 Elec eng Electric engine 3 4 4 4 1 4830 0 2 1 
                                                 
17
 T&D: Transport and distribution 
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Nam i
Inp
ut Output
 Efficiency
Levellized 
Cost 
(U /kWy
CO2 
Emissions
16
 
(tC/kWyr) 
Group
ID LBDe Descript on ID ID S$ r)ID 
53 FC el cell) 3 8 4 4 1 4830 0 3 2 H2 engine (fu
54 Elec d
rgy services from
) 885 2 2 ev 
electricity  
(e.g. IT
ene  
3 4 4 2 1 3 0 
55 H2 de
es from
)  3 2 v H2 (e.g. IT
energy servic  
3 8 4 2 1 3885 0 
56 Coal n eds   (0.814) 2 1 f Coal for fe tock 3 1 4 5 0.7 3 
57 Oil nf or feedsto (0.631) 2 1  Oil f ck 3 3 4 5 1 3 
58 Gas n (0.482) 2 1 f Gas for feedstock 3 5 4 5 1 3 
59 Met n
for 
 3 (0.549) 2 1 f feedstock 
Methanol 
3 2 4 5 1 
60 Eth nf Ethanol for feedstock 6 4 5 1 3 (0.549) 2 1 3 
61 H2 nf H2 for feedstock 3 8 4 5 1 3 0 2 1 
62 Deu H2 H2 from deuterium 0 9 2 9 0.6 1496 0 3 2 
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 Table 2.  Energy forms/flows/currencies of the model. 
 
Level Level 
 
ID Name Label ID Name Label 
0 1 
 
Coal C es 2 8 E cit Elec Secondaryoal R ource lectri y 
0 2 Crude O es H en H2 Secondary oil il R ource 2 9 ydrog  
0 3 Gas G es Coal Final as R ource 3 1 Coal 
0 4 Bioma B es M no Meth Final ss io R ource 3 2 etha l 
0 5 Uraniu U es 3 3 O odu OilP Final m ran R ource il Pr cts 
0 6 Wind Wind Resource E Elec Final 3 4 lectricity 
0 7 Hydro H es G Gas Final  ydro R ource 3 5 as 
0 8 Solar S es 3 6 E  tha Final olar R ource thanol E
1 2 Crude oil Oil Primary 3 7 B Bio Final iomass 
2 1 Coal C c 3 8 H en 2 Final oal Se ondary ydrog  H
2 2 Metha M c L ight Useful nol eth Se ondary 4 1 ight L
2 3 Oil Products O 4 2 E 2 Ser ices
/H2 
Ser Useful ilP Secondary /H v
E
2 4 Gas Gas Secondary 4 3 Heat Heat Useful 
2 5 Ethanol Etha Secondary 4 4 Mechanical Mech Useful 
2 6 Biomass Bio Secondary 4 5 Non-Fuel Non-f Useful 
2 7 Nuclear fuel Nu-f Secondary     
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 r values of energy service demanTable 3. Paramete ds, resource depletion, and number of 
 and combinations. 
Par o demand ice
technology draws
 
s in Eq. 4 ameters related t  for energy serv
Service demands  
) 
(initial demand) 
(KW
(annual growth rate) (price elasticity) 
(useful energy
0
id
yr ) 
ia
p
ie  
Light 4% 0.2 410  
Ele/h2 Service 
(at emergence)  
4% 0.2 6105  
Heat 8106.4   2% 0.5 
Mechanical 7102  3% 0.3 
Non-Fuel 3% 0.3 6105.3   
Parameters related to resou  depletion, in Eq. 8 in Appendix A rce
Resources 
 (initial extraction costib ) ig (speed of cost increase)  
Coal 16.97 610  
Crude oil 50 61.2 10´  
Gas 80 61.5 10´  
Biomass 8 63 10´  
Uranium 100 68 10´  
Parameters related to number of draws and combinations, in Eq. 10 
 66 7.
Resource extraction costs are estimated based on Rogner  (1997). 
 
    
 
 
Table 4. Assumed upper limits on the annual use of ass, hydro, and wind. 
 
renewable resources Upper limit on annual use (kWyr) 
 biom
Biomass 
  
10106.2 
Hydro 
  
9106.3 
Wind 9105.9   
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Table 5. Other model parameter values used in base line simulations 
 
values 
 
Design parameters 
t Eq. (6) (limit on market share change ) -0.1 
x Eq.(7) (initial share of a new technology)  0.0001
m  (probability of a successful draw) 0.01 
k  (retention time of a technology/chain) time steps  300k >
 
 
 
